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AUTONOMOUS MOTHERHOOD AND THE 
LAW: EXPLORING THE NARRATIVES OF 
CANADA’S SINGLE MOTHERS BY 
CHOICE 
 
By Fiona Kelly* 
 
Abstract: In the past three decades, single mothers by choice 
(SMCs) have emerged as a new and rapidly growing 
component of Canada’s single mother population. SMCs are 
women who choose to have a child, usually via some form of 
assisted conception, with the intention that they be their child’s 
sole parent. While SMCs are part of an increasing number of 
non-normative family configurations in Canada, they pose 
some unique social and legal questions. However, unlike some 
other non-normative families, such as lesbian and gay families, 
SMCs have received very little academic attention and almost 
none pertaining to the role of law in their lives. In an effort to 
fill this knowledge gap, this article presents the findings from a 
small interview-based study of Canadian SMCs that explored 
the ways in which the pre-conception decision-making and 
post-birth experiences of the mothers were shaped by law. 
Though the law was rarely an overt presence in the women’s 
lives, they identified three aspects of becoming and being an 
SMC that were nonetheless shaped by law: (i) the pre-
conception period during which they were forced to navigate a 
largely unregulated fertility industry; (ii) when making 
decisions about the type of sperm donor with which to 
conceive; and (iii) once they had their child, the ways in which 
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everyday activities were sometimes complicated by a legal 




While single mother families have long been part of the 
Canadian familial landscape, in the past three decades a new 
type of single mother has emerged: single mothers by choice 
(SMCs). SMCs are women who become mothers, usually via 
adoption or assisted conception, with the intention of being the 
child’s sole parent from the outset. They choose to have and 
parent their children alone, though often with substantial 
networks of support around them. While the number of SMCs 
in Canada appears to be growing at a fairly rapid rate, they 
have received virtually no academic attention or legal 
recognition. SMCs have been largely omitted from the growing 
number of provincial statutory reforms related to legal 
parentage 1  and, on the few occasions in which they have 
appeared in Canadian courts,2 judges have refused to accept 
that a woman can choose to parent on her own. Though SMCs 
rarely experience the overt intervention of law in their lives, as 
this article demonstrates, the preference of law for a two-
parent, biological family, can make choosing to become an 
SMC fraught with legal complexity.  
 
                                                   
1  Vital Statistics Act, CCSM c V60, s 3(6); arts 538-42 CCQ; Family 
Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 5.1(1)(a); Child Status Act, RSPEI 
1988, c C-6, ss 9(5) & 9(6); Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25. 
2  Johnson-Steeves v Lee [1997] AJ no 512 (Alta QB); Johnson-Steeves 
v Lee [1997] AJ no 1057 
(Alta CA); Caufield v Wong, 2007 ABQB 732; G.E.S. v D.L.C. 
[2005] SJ no 354 (Sask QB); GES v DLC [2006] SJ no 419 (Sask 
CA); Doe v Alberta [2005] AJ no 1719 (Alta QB); Doe v Alberta 
[2007] AJ no 138 (Alta CA); LB & EB c. GN, [2011] JQ no 7881. 




While single mothering by choice is growing in 
popularity, there is only limited legal 3  and social science 4 
research addressing the phenomenon. Because the practice is so 
new, the majority of existing research focuses on 
demographics, the decision-making process the women 
undertake, and the social and economic reality of their lives 
once their children are born. The research also derives 
primarily from the United States. The lack of academic 
attention given to the legal experiences of SMCs means that we 
have little sense of how, and in what ways, this particular group 
of single mothers interacts with the law. In an effort to fill this 
                                                   
3  The legal treatment of SMCs has been given limited attention in 
Canada: Susan Boyd, “Autonomy for Mothers: Relational Theory and 
Parenting Apart” (2010) 18:2 Fem Legal Stud 137; Fiona Kelly, 
“Autonomous from the Start: Single Mothers by Choice in the 
Canadian Legal System (2012) 24:3 Child and Family Law Quarterly 
257 [Kelly, “Autonomous from the Start”]; Fiona Kelly, “Equal 
Parents, Equal Children: Reforming Canada’s parentage laws to 
recognize the completeness of women-led families” (2013) 64 
UNBLJ 253 [Kelly, “Equal Parents, Equal Children”]; Angela 
Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & Fiona Kelly, “De-Anonymising Sperm 
Donors in Canada: Some Doubts and Directions” (2010) 26 Can J 
Fam L 95; Robert Leckey, “Two Mothers in Law and Fact” (2013) 21 
Fem Legal Stud 1; Susan Boyd, “Rights of Single Moms by Choice 
Collide with Claims of Genetic Dads”, The Lawyers Weekly (15 
February 2008) at 13. 
4  Vasanti Jadva, Shirlene Badger, Mikki Morrissette & Susan 
Golombok, “Mom by Choice, Single by Life’s Circumstances . . . 
Findings from a Large Scale Survey of the Experiences of Single 
Mothers by Choice” (2009) 12:4 Human Fertility 175; Rosanna 
Hertz, Single by Chance, Mothers by Choice: How Women are 
Choosing Parenthood Without Marriage and Creating the New 
American Family (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 13; 
Fiona MacCallum & Susan Golombok, “Children Raised in 
Fatherless Families From Infancy: A Follow-up of Children of 
Lesbian and Single Heterosexual Mothers at Early Adolescence” 
(2004) 45:8 Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 1407. 
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knowledge gap, this article presents the findings from a small 
interview-based study of SMCs that addressed, amongst other 
things, the ways in which the pre-conception decision-making 
and post-birth experiences of the mothers were shaped by law.  
 
The article begins with a discussion of the social and 
legal context in which SMCs parent, focusing in particular on 
how the rise of neo-liberalism, and its impact on family law, 
has both benefitted and hindered SMCs. Part 2 provides an 
overview of the study, including a demographic description of 
the participants. Drawing on the interview data, Part 3 of the 
article analyses the ways in which law limits and constructs the 
experiences and decision-making of SMCs. The mothers 
identified three aspects of becoming and being an SMC that 
were shaped by the law, though rarely through overt 
intervention: (i) the pre-conception period during which they 
had to navigate the law, or absence of law, surrounding the 
fertility industry; (ii) when making decisions about the type of 
sperm donor (known or anonymous) with which to conceive; 
and (iii) once they had their child, the ways in which common 
activities, such as border crossings, were complicated by a 
legal system that assumes a two parent, biological family. The 
article concludes with some brief suggestions for reform. 
 
SINGLE MOTHERS BY CHOICE: THE SOCIAL AND 
LEGAL CONTEXT 
 
While women who actively choose to become single mothers 
have existed for some time, the prevalence of SMCs appears to 
have increased substantially in the past decade. Though it is 
impossible to know exactly how many Canadian SMCs there 
are, a number of factors suggest their numbers are growing. 
Recent statistics show that an increasing number of older 
women are becoming single mothers, which accords with 
research showing that SMCs tend have their first child in their 




late 30s or early 40s.5 The number of single women aged 35-39 
having children has risen from 3935 in 1991 to 9706 in 2011.6 
There has also been a significant increase in births during the 
same time period to single women aged 30-34 and 40-44. By 
contrast, single women in their 20s have experienced little 
increase in births during the same time period. Although it is 
impossible to know the circumstances surrounding the 
pregnancies of these solo mothers in their 30s and 40s, a 
demographic not typically associated with accidental 
pregnancy, it is possible that it represents a growth in single 
motherhood by choice. Statistics from Canadian fertility clinics 
seem to support this assertion. According to Dr Sam Batarseh, 
director of IVF Canada, the number of single women coming to 
his clinic for donor insemination has tripled in the last thirty 
years. 7 In 2010, at Vancouver’s largest fertility clinic, single 
women represented just over 13 per cent of clients 
(approximately 280 women).8 Some U.S. fertility clinics report 
that up to 20 per cent of their clientele are single women.9  
 
The enormous growth in both face-to-face and online 
support groups for SMCs also suggests a surge in their 
numbers. The international organization Single Mothers by 
Choice, which has chapters in most North American cities, has 
grown from a one-woman operation in 1981 to an international 
                                                   
5  Hertz, ibid. 
6  Statistics Canada, Live births, by age and marital status of mother, 
Canada, CANSIM Table 102-4507 (annual). 
7  Cited in Helen Buttery, “The single life: Affluent, educated and 
autonomous - why are more women enjoying motherhood on their 
own?”, Elle Magazine, online: Elle Magazine Online 
<http://www.ellecanada.com>. 
8  Statistics obtained via private communication in 2011 with Genesis 
Fertility Centre.  
9  See, for example, The Sperm Bank of California: 
<http://www.thespermbankofca.org/content/why-choose-tsbc>. 
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organization with over 13,000 members during its thirty-year 
existence.10 A second organization, Choice Moms, oversees an 
active website, blog, 11  and internet message board, has 
produced numerous “how to” guides as well as the book 
Choosing Single Motherhood: A Thinking Woman’s Guide, and 
facilitates five to ten workshops a year in the U.S. and Canada 
to promote and support what it refers to as “choice 
motherhood”.  
 
Given that single mothering can be both challenging 
and a much maligned identity in western society,12 one might 
ask why a growing number of women are choosing to become 
single mothers. There is no clear answer to this question. 
However, a number of social and legal factors have combined 
in recent years to create the circumstances in which single 
mothering by choice may be viewed as an acceptable, or even 
appealing, option for some women. The increased workplace 
participation and thus economic independence of women,13 the 
growing acceptance of and availability to single women of 
assisted reproduction services, and the increasing legal and 
                                                   
10  Information obtained via private correspondence with Jane Mattes.  
11  See <http://www.choicemoms.org/>. 
12  A recent Pew Research Center survey conducted in the United States 
found that over 70 per cent of those surveyed thought that “mothers 
having children without male partners to help raise them” is ‘bad for 
society’”. Paul Taylor, Rich Morin & Wendy Wang, “The Public 
Renders a Split Verdict on Changes in Family Structure”, Pew 
Research Center (16 February 2011) online: Pew Research Center 
<http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/02/Pew-Social-Trends-
Changes-In-Family-Structure.pdf> at 2. 
13  In 2008, 59.3% of women aged 15 and over were in paid employment 
in Canada compared to 41% of women in 1976. Statistic Canada, 
Women in Canada: A Gender-based Statistical Report (1 April 2011). 




social recognition of non-normative family of various kinds,14 
have created an environment in which women may feel that it 
is possible to choose single motherhood. Given the prevalence 
of separation and divorce, single mothering has also become an 
increasingly common feature of the Canadian familial 
landscape.15 Yet as this article demonstrates, while SMCs may 
enjoy a more accepting social environment than single mothers 
of previous generations, they nonetheless experience 
significant legal obstacles unique to their position as single 
mother by choice. Some of the legal challenges SMCs 
experience are the product of the inherent hetero-normativity of 
family law, while others stem from the growing influence of 
neo-liberalism within Canadian society. 
 
Hetero-normativity and neo-liberalism interact in the 
family law context to produce some contradictory trends for 
women who create non-normative families. As Brenda 
Cossman has argued, neo-liberalism is not particularly wedded 
to a specific family form provided that the private family can 
absorb the costs of reproduction. 16  Thus, the expansion of 
family law to include non-normative families, such as lesbian 
and gay families, poses no direct challenge to neo-liberalism as 
long as the family members are capable of internalizing costs. 
In fact, some law reforms, such as the extension of spousal and 
                                                   
14  For example, the legal recognition of same-sex parents via provincial 
parentage laws (e.g, Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, ss 23-33) and 
the legal recognition of same sex marriage (Civil Marriage Act, SC 
2005, c 33). 
15  There were over 1 million female-headed lone parent families in 
Canada in 2001, an increase of 13% since 1996 and 35% since 1991. 
Statistics Canada, Women in Canada (Ottawa: Target Group Project, 
2006) (Catalogue No 89-503-XIE) at 38. 
16  Brenda Cossman, “Family Feuds: Neo-Liberal and Neo-conservative 
Visions of the Reprivatization Project” in Brenda Cossman & Judy 
Fudge, eds, Privatization, Law, and the Challenge to Feminism 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 169 at 182. 
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child support obligations to same-sex spouses, serve to extend 
the reach of neo-liberalism’s privatization project.17 However, 
because of neo-liberalism’s commitment to privatization – the 
process whereby the costs of social reproduction are shifted 
from the public sphere to the private family unit18 – there is 
typically a preference for two parent families, the assumption 
being that two parents are better able to bear the costs of 
privatization than one. While the second parent need not be the 
child’s biological father, because biological parents have 
presumptive financial obligations to their children, the desire 
for a second parent often translates into finding the biological 
father of the child. In fact, case law suggests that where the 
biological father of a child born to an SMC wishes to be 
involved in the child’s life, he is likely to succeed, even when 
such an outcome is contrary to his pre-conception agreement.19  
 
Canadian family law has also been heavily influenced 
in recent decades by the fathers’ rights movement 20  which 
                                                   
17  See e.g, M v H, [1999] 2 SCR 3 in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that excluding same-sex couples from the Ontario 
spousal support regime was unconstitutional. One of the arguments 
used to support the conclusion was that because the existing 
legislation left “potentially dependent individuals without a means of 
obtain support from their former partners”, it “burdens the public 
purse with their care” (at para 283). 
18  Cossman, supra note 16 at 169. 
19  For a list of relevant cases, see note 2. 
(Alta CA); Caufield v Wong, 2007 ABQB 732; GES v DLC, [2005] 
SJ no 354 (Sask QB); GES v DLC, [2006] SJ no 419 (Sask CA); Doe 
v Alberta [2005] AJ no 1719 (Alta QB); Doe v Alberta [2007] AJ no 
138 (Alta CA); LB & EB c GN, [2011] JQ no 7881. 
20  Susan Boyd & Claire Young, “Who Influences Family Law Reform? 
Discourses on Motherhood and Fatherhood in Legislative Reform 
Debates in Canada” (2002) 26 Studies in Law, Politics, and 
Society 43; Susan Boyd, “Is Equality Enough? Fathers' Rights and 
Women's Rights Advocacy” in Rosemary Hunter, ed, Rethinking 




tends to reinforce the neo-liberal preference for a second 
parent, though typically out of a desire to preserve the hetero-
normative, patriarchal nuclear family, rather than fiscal 
restraint. The effect of the fathers’ rights movement on family 
law can be seen in legislative21 or de facto presumptions in 
favour of shared parenting, 22  a judicial presumption that 
father/child access is in a child’s best interests, 23  and the 
                                                                                                   
Equality Projects in Law: Feminist Challenges (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008) 59. 
21  For example, section 39 of British Columbia’s new Family Law Act, 
SBC 2011, c 25, includes a presumption in favour of joint 
guardianship in circumstances where the parents have cohabited. It is 
speculated that the federal government will soon propose similar 
amendments to the Divorce Act. C Schmitz, “Divorce Act Reforms 
Could be Coming Down the Pipe”, The Lawyers Weekly (15 July 
2011).   
22  A number of scholars have argued that there is a de facto presumption 
in favour of shared parenting already operating in Canadian family 
law. This argument is supported by the dramatic increase in court-
ordered joint custody awards over the past twenty years, despite the 
absence of any legislative impetus for the change. Statistics Canada 
reported that in 2003, 44% of court-determined custody cases arising 
out of a divorce resulted in an order for joint custody, more than 
double the rate from the mid-1990s and four times the rate of the late 
1980s. Statistics Canada, Women in Canada (Ottawa: Target Group 
Project, 2006) (Catalogue no 89-503-XIE) at 40.  
23  My research on supervised access decision-making demonstrated that 
it is not uncommon for judges to cite a presumption, not found in the 
relevant legislation, that father/child access is in a child’s best 
interests. For example, the Ontario Superior Court stated in 2004 that 
“[t]here is a presumption that regular access by a non-custodial parent 
is in the best interests of children”: VSJ v LJG (2004), 5 RFL (6th) 
319 at para 128. This assertion has been cited with approval in Elwan 
v Al-Taher (2009), 69 RFL (6th) 199 at para 76 (Ont Sup Ct J); MI v 
MW, [2011] OJ no 1685 (QL) at para 102 (Sup CJ); Norman v 
Penney (2010), 305 Nfld & PEIR 241at para 22 (SC Trial Div); 
Matos v Driesman (2009), 86 WCB (2d) 27 at para 39 (Ont Sup Ct J). 
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imposition of “fathers” on lesbian families.24 These trends have 
a particularly drastic effect on SMCs. While there is only 
limited case law in the area, it is common in disputes where 
known sperm donors challenge the sole parentage of SMCs for 
judges to draw little distinction between the legal status of men 
who conceive a child via intercourse and those who donate 
their sperm to a woman they know.25 The child’s need for a 
father is understood as paramount and judges assume that these 
men can only add to women-led families. As Jenni Millbank 
explains in the context of lesbian-headed families:  
 
[B]ecause it is same-gendered parenting, the 
addition of a male parent is not seen to take 
away anything from the family (for example, by 
intruding on their autonomy or invalidating their 
family form), it only adds to it. The mothers are 
viewed as inexplicably trying to deny their child 
something good, something special and 
something that their family lacks; a daddy. The 
mothers’ behavior in resisting a third parent in 
their family is therefore selfish, non-child 
centered and weird; while the donor/father’s 
behavior in trying to join or control that family 
is natural, understandable and loving.26 
 
                                                                                                   
For a discussion of the trend see Fiona Kelly, “Enforcing a 
Parent/Child Relationship at all Cost? Supervised Access Orders in 
the Canadian Courts” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 277 at 298. 
24  Jenni Millbank, “The Limits of Functional Family” (2008) 22 Int’l J 
Law Pol’y & Fam 149; Kelly, “Equal Parents, Equal Children”, supra 
note 3. 
25  For an overview of the Canadian case law see Kelly, “Autonomous 
from the start”, supra note 3. 
26  Millbank, supra note 24 at 162.   




Millbank’s analysis is even more persuasive in the 
context of families headed by an SMC. Adding a “father” to an 
SMC family is not understood as an intrusion because the 
family is perceived as having an inherent “gap”: the lack of a 
second parent. While lesbian parents may be able to argue that 
their child already has two parents and thus their family is 
complete, SMCs have the double burden of overcoming the 
preference for both a father and a two-parent family.  
 
Unfortunately, provincial parentage laws do little to 
alleviate the situation for SMCs, particularly those who 
conceive with known donors. The parentage laws of only one 
province, Quebec, explicitly envisage the possibility of an 
SMC, 27  though the sole judicial decision made under the 
provision was decided in favour of the donor. 28  The very 
limited case law outside of Quebec – typically access and 
parentage disputes between SMCs and their known donors – 
has all been concluded in favour of the donor.29 Though each 
of the cases was factually complex, the results are not 
particularly heartening for SMCs. There have, however, been a 
                                                   
27  Article 538 of the Quebec Civil Code states that: “A parental project 
involving assisted procreation exists from the moment a person alone 
decides or spouses by mutual consent decide, in order to have a child, 
to resort to the genetic material of a person who is not party to the 
parental project.” Article 538.2 establishes states that, “The 
contribution of genetic material for the purposes of a third-party 
parental project does not create any bond of filiation between the 
contributor and the child born of the parental project.” Thus, in the 
case of a woman alone deciding to enter into a parental project the 
sole filial relationship established is between the child and mother. 
Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 1991, c 64. 
28  LB & EB c GN, [2011] JQ no 7881. 
29  Johnson-Steeves v Lee [1997] AJ No 512 (Alta QB); Johnson-Steeves 
v Lee [1997] AJ no 1057 (Alta CA); C.C v A.W [2005] AJ no 428; 
Caufield v Wong, 2007 ABQB 732; Doe v Alberta [2005] AJ no 1719 
(Alta. Q.B.); Doe v Alberta [2007] AJ no 138 (Alta CA). 
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number of statutory reforms directed at protecting the 
parentage of lesbian couples that have simultaneously 
benefitted SMCs. For example, several Canadian provinces 
now have a statutory provision stating that a gamete donor is 
not, by reason of his or her donation, a legal parent.30Section 
24 of British Columbia’s new Family Law Act states that: 
 
If a child is born as a result of assisted 
reproduction, a donor who provided human 
reproductive material or an embryo for the 
assisted reproduction of a child 
(a) is not, by reason only of the donation, the 
child’s parent, 
(b) may not be declared by a court, by reason  
only of the donation, to be a child’s parent, 
and 
(c) is the child’s parent only if determined, 
under this Part, to be the child’s parent.31 
 
Section 24 can be relied upon by any individual who 
conceives a child via “assisted reproduction”, defined as “a 
method of conceiving a child other than by sexual 
intercourse.”32 An SMC who conceives with a known donor 
                                                   
30  Vital Statistics Act, CCSM c V60, s 3(6); Civil Code of Quebec, SQ 
1992, c 64, arts 538-42; Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5, s 
5.1(1)(a); Child Status Act, RSPEI 1988, c C-6, ss 9(5) & 9(6); 
Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25. While Nova Scotia’s Vital 
Statistics Act, RSNS 1989, c 494, makes no mention of same-sex 
couples or assisted reproduction in its birth registration provisions, 
regulations under the Act permit the mother’s spouse, male or female, 
to register as a legal parent where a child is conceived via “assisted 
conception”, defined as “conception that occurs as a result of artificial 
reproductive technology, using an anonymous sperm donor.” See 
Birth Registration Regulations, NS Reg 390/2007. 
31  Family Law Act, SBC 2011, c 25, s 24(1). 
32  Ibid at s 20(1). 




should therefore benefit from the presumption found in section 
24. It is evident, however, from the surrounding provisions, as 
well as the various law reform documents that preceded the 
introduction of the Family Law Act, that the assumption 
underlying section 24 is that a second parent will take the place 
of the gamete donor.33 In an SMC family, this is obviously not 




Despite the rapid increase in SMCs in recent years, almost 
nothing is known about their interactions with the law. As the 
discussion above suggests, while Canadian family law is 
increasingly accommodating of some non-normative families, 
it continues to pose serious challenges to women who choose 
to parent without a partner. In an attempt to better understand 
the role law plays in the lives of SMCs, ten women who self-
identified as SMCs were interviewed. The women were all 
members of their local SMC support group, lived within a 
150km radius of a large Canadian city, and were recruited via 
the group’s online message board. Due to the small sample 
                                                   
33  See for example, the Public Consultation document issued by the 
Attorney General’s office in which a discussion of the legal parentage 
of the birth mother is followed by the sub-heading “Who is the other 
legal parent?” Similarly, the discussion of the parentage provisions in 
the White Paper on Family Relations Act Reform assumes that the 
birth mother has a partner and that the partner will be the child’s 
second legal parent. This assumption is reflected in section 27 of the 
Family Law Act, which extends presumptive parentage to the birth 
mother’s spouse. British Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General 
Justice Services Branch Civil and Family Law Policy Office, Family 
Relations Act Review: Report of Public Consultations (British 
Columbia: Civil and Family Law Policy Office, 2009) at 48. British 
Columbia, Ministry of Attorney General Justice Services Branch 
Civil Policy and Legislation Office, White Paper on Family Relations 
Act Reform: Proposals for a new Family Law Act (British Columbia: 
Civil and Family Law Police Office, 2010) at 30. 
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size, it is necessary to be cautious about making any 
generalizations about the SMC population in Canada. 
However, given the absence of any other empirical work with 
Canadian SMCs, the data nonetheless provides us with some 
important insight into the SMC experience. 
 
Demographically, the participants in the study were 
virtually identical to SMCs who have participated in similar 
research in the United States and United Kingdom. 34  They 
were a fairly homogenous group that shared little, at least 
demographically, with most other single mothers.35 Almost all 
were Caucasian, most earned over $50,000 and many had an 
annual income of $75,000 to $100,000. However, two were 
self-employed with variable incomes, sometimes earning as 
low as $20,000 in a year. However, in both cases the women 
                                                   
34  Hertz, supra note 4; Jadva, supra note 4; Valerie Mannis, “Single 
Mothers by Choice” (1999) 48:2 Family Relations 121; Rosanna 
Hertz & Faith Ferguson, “Kinship Strategies and Self-Sufficiency 
Among Single Mothers by Choice: Post Modern Family Ties” (1997) 
20:2 Qualitative Sociology 187; Jane Bock, “Doing the Right Thing? 
Single Mothers by Choice and the Struggle for Legitimacy” (2000) 
14:1 Gender & Society 62; Susan Golombok & Shirlene Badger, 
“Children Raised in Mother-headed Families from Infancy: A 
Follow-up of Children of Lesbian and Single Heterosexual Mothers, 
at Early Adulthood” (2010) 25:1 Human Reproduction 150.   
35  The most notable difference between the SMCs interviewed and 
single mothers as a broader population was with regard to economic 
stability. The SMCs were significantly better off than the average 
single mother in Canada. For example, the average income of the 
SMCs interviewed was well above that of single mothers generally 
($42,300 in 2008) and, while two of the women had experienced a 
year or two of low income (usually by choice), none were living in 
poverty. By contrast, 21 per cent of Canadian single mothers live in 
poverty (compared to nine per cent of the general population and 
seven per cent of single fathers). Statistic Canada, Women in Canada: 
A Gender-based Statistical Report (2011) (Catalogue no: 89-503-
XWE). 




had chosen to reduce their workload so they could spend more 
time with their child, a luxury most other single mothers do not 
enjoy. Almost all had attended university, with half holding a 
graduate degree, a figure substantially higher than the general 
population.36 Most of the women were professionals of some 
sort, with their occupations including accountant, lawyer, 
school counselor, and a professional staff member at a 
university. Their average age at the time of their first child’s 
birth was 38 and all but one had only one child. The average 
age of the children was three. All of the women were biological 
mothers who had conceived their children via donor 
insemination or in vitro fertilization. Two of the women 
conceived with known donors, while the remaining eight used 
anonymous donor sperm purchased from a sperm bank. Six of 
the eight anonymous donors were designated “open identity” 
which meant that the donor’s identifying information could be 
accessed by the child upon reaching the age of majority.   
 
While the women who participated in the study were 
demographically similar to SMCs interviewed for other 
research, two features distinguished the sample from others. 
First, less than half of the women owned the property in which 
they lived. The majority rented 1 or 2 bedroom apartments or 
lived in co-operative housing, and few anticipated being able to 
purchase a home in the near future. While the lack of home 
ownership might suggest that the women interviewed for this 
study were not as financially secure as SMCs who participated 
in other studies, the more likely explanation is that the cost of 
housing in the region is unusually high. Notably, the three 
women who owned houses lived in semi-rural areas, well 
outside of the city. The second demographic difference was 
                                                   
36  According to Statistics Canada, 6.5% of working-age Canadians in 
2010 had a graduate degree. Statistics Canada, “Table 282-0004 - 
Labour force survey estimates by educational attainment, sex and age 
group” online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/12-581-
x/2012000/edu-eng.htm>. 
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that only half of the women identified as heterosexual, a figure 
considerably lower than recorded in other studies. One woman 
identified as lesbian, one as queer, one as bisexual, and two 
described their sexuality as undetermined or “in progress”. It is 
difficult to know why such a large proportion of the women 
identified as something other than heterosexual as there is no 
indication from other research that queer women are attracted 
to single mothering by choice at greater rates than heterosexual 
women. That said, the region in which the women live is 
known for its progressive politics and large, well-established 
lesbian and gay communities. It is therefore possible that non-
heterosexual women are simply a greater percentage of the 
overall population than in other places, or that living in a 
politically progressive environment makes women feel more 
comfortable exploring their sexuality. 
 
With the exception of these two demographic 
differences, the study re-confirmed that SMCs tend to share a 
number of distinct characteristics: they are usually in their late 
30s or early 40s, well educated, financially independent, and 
Caucasian. SMCs are thus a fairly privileged group of women, 
particularly when compared to single mothers by chance or 
those who become single mothers due to separation or divorce. 
There is no doubt that the class and race privilege of the SCMs 
interviewed enhanced their ability to choose single motherhood 
as well as navigate the legal system. In particular, because they 
were largely capable of economic self-sufficiency, they were 
able to avoid the economic stigma associated with single 
motherhood in the neo-liberal era.37  
                                                   
37  Relying on historical data, Lori Chambers has argued that women 
who choose to become single mothers and who have sufficient 
economic independence to support their child may experience less 
stigma than single mothers who live in poverty. Lori Chambers, 
Misconceptions: Unmarried Motherhood and the Ontario Children of 
Unmarried Parents Act, 1921 to 1969 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2007). 




While all of the women interviewed indicated that they 
had “chosen” to become single mothers, self-identified as 
“single mothers by choice”, and considered themselves to be 
parenting autonomously, it is important that the notions of 
“choice” and “autonomy”, terms that are closely associated 
with liberal individualism and a central feature of the neo-
liberal project, be problematized. As the demographic analysis 
indicates, the freedom to “choose” single motherhood is 
primarily reserved for a certain class of women: well educated, 
middle to upper class, white women, who are able to purchase 
the services required to achieve single motherhood and deflect, 
via their race and class privilege, the stigma traditionally 
associated with the status. Thus, while women who “choose” to 
parent alone may attract a degree of social acceptance, that 
acceptance is contingent on the woman’s capacity to absorb the 
costs of her (autonomous) social reproduction and be 
independent from the state. Given the social and economic 
context in which they parent, it is not surprising that some 
SMCs become, perhaps unwittingly, proponents of neo-liberal 
thought. At the same time, many SMCs, including those 
interviewed for this study, embrace a version of autonomy that 
is best described as relational.38 Rejecting the paradigm of the 
autonomous liberal individual, most had created rich networks 
of support that often included other SMCs. Thus, their 
autonomy was “nourished in relationships with others.” 39 
Though they did not expressly challenge the social structures 
that demanded self-sufficiency of them, they did undermine 
them in small ways by building self-sufficiency through 
relationship. 
                                                   
38  Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, 
Autonomy, and Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
39  Sumi Madhok, Anne Phillips & Kalpana Wilson, eds, Gender, 
Agency, and Coercion (Thinking Gender in Transnational Times) 
(Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). 
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Single motherhood by choice and the law 
 
While a number of themes emerged from the interviews, this 
article focuses on the mothers’ interactions with the law. 
Participants were provided with a number of opportunities 
during the interview to reflect on the role, if any, law played in 
their lives. Specific questions related to accessing fertility 
services, choosing a donor, and establishing parentage, 
provided an opportunity to discuss the most common legal 
challenges. However, there were many other instances during 
the interviews where legal regulation of various kinds emerged 
as a topic for discussion.  
 
When discussing the role of law in their lives the 
mothers identified three areas of common concern. The first, 
referred to by almost all of the mothers, was the lack of legal 
regulation surrounding the fertility industry. The second was 
with regard to choosing a sperm donor. Many of the mothers 
preferred, or would have at least considered the possibility of, 
using a known donor but felt that the lack of certainty 
surrounding the legal status of such an individual made the 
choice too risky. The final set of concerns raised by the 
mothers related to post-birth challenges to their status as sole 
parents, typically by government employees during fairly 
routine activities such as border crossings. 
 
The legal regulation of the fertility industry 
 
The evolution of reproductive choice in the modern era means 
that women have access to a dizzying array of reproductive 
technologies that enable pregnancy without a partner. The 
fertility industry, made up of both fertility clinics and sperm 
banks, now welcomes single women with open arms. The 
reproductive autonomy enabled by such clinics sets SMCs 
apart from many other single mothers. Achieving pregnancy 
through the services of a fertility clinic, though expensive, 
allows women to take control of the process of becoming a 




mother, reduces the legal and health complications that may be 
associated with other methods of conception and, because of 
the availability of anonymous donor sperm, enables them to 
achieve motherhood in a manner that protects their autonomy 
as their child’s sole parent. Yet almost all of the mothers felt 
that the fertility clinics and sperm banks were not sufficiently 
regulated and that the lack of legal regulation was not in the 
interests of either themselves or their children. 
 
Eight of the ten women interviewed conceived using 
anonymous donor sperm through the services of a fertility 
clinic. None experienced any barriers in accessing a clinic or 
purchasing sperm and most indicated that they felt welcome as 
single women. However, many of them argued that the 
regulatory environment surrounding the fertility industry was 
extremely troubling. The most common complaint pertained to 
the lack of legal control over the number of offspring each 
donor could produce and the perceived dishonesty of the sperm 
banks with regard to this issue. A smaller number of women 
complained that the few regulations that did exist, such as those 
pertaining to the use of known donor sperm within a clinic 
environment, 40 were misguided and particularly onerous for 
single women.  
 
By far the most common concern the women had about 
the fertility industry, and the issue around which they felt most 
vulnerable, was the complete absence of statutory regulation of 
sperm banks. In particular, the women were concerned that, 
despite strict regulations with regard to how sperm is 
processed, Canadian law places no limit on the number of 
offspring produced by a particular donor. It is thus possible for 
                                                   
40  Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception 
Regulations (SOR/96-254); Technical Requirements for Therapeutic 
Donor Insemination (Health Canada Directive, July 2000) online: 
<http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-
dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/semen-sperme_directive-eng.pdf>. 
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a child to have in excess of a hundred donor siblings.  For 
Sally, whose daughter has at least 70 half-siblings, this 
information, inadvertently gleaned during a conversation with a 
sperm bank employee, caused significant distress. As she 
explained, “Well, I kind of freaked out internally [when I found 
out]. I mean I had an internal freak out, just in terms of the 
number, the number of half siblings.”  
 
In addition to placing no limits on the number of donor 
offspring, Canada also has no independent watchdog 
overseeing the industry, which means that sperm banks can, 
and do, make assertions about offspring numbers that go 
unchecked. For example, Canada’s only sperm bank, 
ReproMed, is self-regulating. In its internal guidelines it claims 
to attempt “to limit Donors to three live births per region of 
100,000 populations. Siblings of the same patient using the 
same Donor are considered one live birth.” 41  As has been 
pointed out by a Canadian journalist, this could entail as many 
as 75 donor offspring living in a city the size of Toronto. 42 
ReproMed also claims to perform “regularly scheduled surveys 
of our physicians and treatment outcomes of their patients, and 
employs these data to monitor use of certain Donors in 
particular geographical areas.” 43  Yet, there is no legal 
requirement that parents report the conception or birth of a 
child using sperm from ReproMed. In fact, a U.S. study of 
5000 sperm bank users conducted in 2011 by the American 
Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) found that 35 per 
cent of participants had not or did not plan to report their 
                                                   
41  “Donor FAQ”, online: Repromed < http://www.repromed.ca/ 
donor_faq>. 
42  Tom Blackwell, “Limit pregnancies by same sperm donor: Fertility 
experts”, National Post (8 September 2011) online: The National Post 
< http://news.nationalpost.com>. 
43  “Donor FAQ”, supra note 41. 




pregnancy to the sperm bank.44 As the authors of the study 
noted, this lack of reporting “does not allow for accurate 
pregnancy tracking to limit the number of family units per 
donor.”45 The situation appears to be similar in Canada. In fact, 
a number of the women interviewed noted that, while they had 
reported their pregnancy to the fertility clinic, they had not 
known until several years after the fact that they were also 
supposed to notify the sperm bank.  
 
While the situation in Canada is concerning, an 
estimated 95 per cent of sperm used in Canadian fertility 
clinics is actually imported from the United States. 46  The 
largest provider of sperm to Canada appears to be Fairfax 
Cryobank which claims to cover “over 80% of the Canadian 
sperm market.” 47  Fairfax’s policy for limiting offspring 
numbers can be found on the bank’s website. It states: 
 
Fairfax Cryobank limits the total number of 
births for any donor based on the application of 
several criteria. Specifically, a donor's sales will 
cease when either of the following criteria is 
reached: 
1 When 25 family units (children from the same 
donor living in one home) have been reported in 
the US. International distribution stops when 15 
family units have been reported. After the family 
                                                   
44  Michelle Ottey & Suzanne Seitz, “Trends in donor sperm purchasing, 
disclosure of donor origins to offspring, and the effects of sexual 
orientation and relationship status on choice of donor category: a 
three year study” (2011) 96 Fertility and Sterility S268. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Blackwell, supra note 42. 
47  “International Role of Fairfax Cryobank”, online: Fairfax Cryobank 
<http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/blog/?p=110>. 
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unit limits have been met, vials will only be 
distributed for sibling pregnancies; OR 
2. Total number of units sold reaches our 
designated limit (actual numbers are not 
disclosed).48  
 
According to the first part of the policy, Fairfax appears to cap 
distribution at 40 families worldwide. While this may appear 
modest on a global scale, it is necessary to take into account the 
ASRM finding that approximately 35% of families will not 
report their pregnancies. If it is assumed that each of the 
reporting families has between 1-3 children (siblings are 
treated as only one child under the policy), the 40 family units 
will have produced approximately 80 children. If the 
unreported children are added (an additional 35% of families, 
each with 1-3 children) a single Fairfax donor may have 
produced up to 108 offspring. When one also takes into 
account that women often “sell on” leftover vials through 
online groups or that some men donate to more than one sperm 
bank,49 the numbers may be considerably higher. The second 
element of the Fairfax policy, which can be applied as an 
alternative to the first paragraph, is similarly concerning. The 
second option available to Fairfax is to cease sales of a 
particular donor when the bank’s designated limit, which it 
expressly refuses to disclose, is reached. With no way of 
knowing what the limit might be or how it is calculated 
(reported births? speculated births? vials sold?), one can only 
speculate as to how many children a donor might produce.  
 
                                                   
48  Emphasis added. “Read First”, online: Fairfax Cryobank 
<http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/ReadFirst.shtml>. 
49  A study of 63 donors, surveyed about their experiences of anonymous 
donation, found that 27 per cent had donated at more than one sperm 
bank. Tabitha Freeman et al, “Sperm and Oocyte Donors’ 
Experiences of Anonymous Donation and Subsequent Contact with 
their Donor Offspring” (2011) 26:3 Human Reproduction 638 at 640. 




Given the existing situation, it is not surprising that the 
mothers expressed concern about the lack of regulation 
surrounding sperm banks, both in Canada and the United 
States. While most of them admitted that they went into the 
process of choosing a donor with considerable naiveté, now 
that they knew more about the fertility industry they felt that 
the absence of a regulatory framework had created a situation 
that was not in their children’s interests. The women’s 
concerns began with the lack of information provided by their 
fertility clinic with regard to choosing a donor. None of the 
women was given any choice about which sperm bank they 
purchased from. Nor were they told that sperm banks have 
different policies with regard to matters such as offspring 
limits, the availability of open-identity donors, and how the 
bank deals with notifications of serious illness in children 
conceived using donor sperm. Rather, the fertility clinic told 
their clients which sperm bank they worked with and instructed 
them to purchase sperm from that bank, typically online. This 
made it virtually impossible for women who were aware of 
differences between sperm banks to exercise any choice. 
Casey, for example, wanted to import sperm from The Sperm 
Bank of California (“TSBC”), a non-profit fertility clinic that 
was established by feminists in the 1980s. TSBC was the first 
sperm bank in the United States to offer services to lesbian 
women, provide open-identity donors, and cap offspring 
numbers at 10 per donor. TSBC also maintains contact with 
families who use their services so that they can accurately track 
offspring numbers. However, because the clinic Casey 
approached did not do business with TSBC, she was told that it 
was not an option. After investigating the two sperm banks that 
were available to her, Casey concluded that both had 
questionable practices with regard to offspring numbers. 
Frustrated with her lack of choice, Casey eventually chose to 
pursue at-home insemination with the sperm of a known donor.  
 
Once the women had their children, many of them 
began to hear troubling information about sperm bank 
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practices, often through conversations with other SMCs. Over 
time, a number of them developed a critique of the industry. 
The most common criticism was that the sperm banks are 
dishonest and that their dishonesty had the potential to create 
social issues for children conceived using donor sperm. As 
Rachel explained, she was led to believe by the sperm bank – 
and she presumed donors were provided with similar 
information – that each donor might produce five or six 
children. She was also given the impression that the sperm 
bank follows up with clients in an effort to track births, which 
she now knows is not true. Concerned by what she was hearing 
about offspring numbers from other SMCs, Rachel contacted 
the sperm bank to ask how many children her daughter’s donor 
had produced. She was told that it was the bank’s policy that 
such information not be disclosed. Rachel was instead referred 
to the website which categorized each donor’s offspring 
numbers as 5, 10, 15, or “20 plus”. Rachel’s donor fell into the 
last category. As Rachel put it, “That could be 21, or it could 
be a hundred!” Due to this experience, Rachel felt quite 
strongly that sperm banks should be legally regulated and, in 
particular, that regulations should dictate a limit on how many 
offspring a donor can produce. She argued that this was 
particularly important in the case of open-identity donors, 
where there was often an expectation on the part of parents that 
the donor would be willing to meet the child. As she explained: 
 
[The open-identity donors will] disappear when 
they realize they have 150 children! I think that 
the whole thing has been presented a little bit 
misleadingly. By the banks and, you know, 
maybe not ever intentionally, but I think that a 
lot of the donors were led to believe they might 
have five or six children. And when they find 
out they have a hundred, they might not be so 
willing to be known. 
 




Sally shared Rachel’s concerns, though in Sally’s case, 
her fears had been realized. When her daughter was an infant, 
Sally logged on to the Donor Sibling Registry to determine 
how many donor-siblings her daughter had. There were 67 
children reported. Given that many families are not aware of 
the DSR and others may not wish to join, the likely number of 
donor siblings was, as Sally put it, “mind boggling”. Sally’s 
donor had chosen an “open identity” status, which meant he 
was willing to have his contact details released to offspring 
when they turned eighteen. Sally felt it was completely 
unrealistic that a donor in such a situation would have the 
willingness, or capacity, to meet or even communicate with 67-
plus children. While she did not envisage her daughter ever 
having a relationship with her donor, Sally was nonetheless 
frustrated with a system that promoted and charged additional 
money for open-identity donors, but did not limit the number of 
offspring they produced. She argued that sperm banks should 
be forced by law to restrict offspring numbers,50 particularly in 
the case of open-identity donors, as well as to implement a 
system of compulsory reporting so that submitting paperwork 
                                                   
50  For example, in the U.K., the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 2008 limits the number of families a donor can assist to ten. The 
justification for this limit was explained in a 2011 press release from 
the regulatory body that governs the fertility industry in the U.K., the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Foundation: “The Authority 
was persuaded by views expressed during the consultation that, for 
psychological reasons, a limit should be placed on the number of 
possible siblings that a donor-conceived person could expect to have. 
There is also a perception that a higher family limit would risk two 
genetically related siblings entering into a relationship without 
knowing they were related (although the actual risk of this remains 
very low).” Human Fertilization and Embrology Authority, “HFEA 
Agrees new policies about family donation and the number of 
families one donor can create”, online: HFEA 
<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/6518.html>. 
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to the sperm bank was part of the birth registration process. 51 
Both Sally and Rachel also expressed concern about the risk of 
inadvertent dating amongst donor siblings in large sibling 
groups, particularly given that the SMC community was fairly 
close-knit. 
 
While most of the women called for more regulation of 
the fertility industry, several noted that the minimal regulation 
that did exist had a disproportionately negative impact on 
SMCs. The most frequently noted concern was with regard to 
the limits imposed by Health Canada on a woman’s use of 
known donor sperm where the donor is not the woman’s sexual 
partner. While a woman can conceive using the sperm of a 
known donor via home insemination without express 
regulation,52 if she finds it necessary to employ the additional 
expertise of a fertility clinic the same donor is subject to the 
Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception 
                                                   
51  Several Australian states have introduced compulsory reporting 
registries for individuals involved in donor conception. For example, 
in the state of Victoria, Part 6 of the Assisted Reproductive Treatment 
Act 2008 (Vic) created a registry, administered by Births, Deaths and 
Marriages, which records information about people involved in donor 
conception. The Central Register records information about births 
arising from the use of donor sperm, eggs or embryos since July 
1988. The treating clinic provides the Registry with information 
about the parents, the donor, and the child that has been born. When 
registering a birth, the parent needs to confirm on the birth 
registration statement that donor conception occurred. The Act also 
introduced a second registry, the Voluntary Register, which allows 
people who have been involved in donor conception in Victoria 
before July 1988, to voluntarily register information about themselves 
and their willingness to exchange information with other persons on 
the Voluntary Register. 
52  Though the legality of doing so remains unclear: Fiona Kelly, “An 
Alternative Conception: The Legality of Home Insemination under 
Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 
149. 




Regulations (“the Regulations”).53 The Regulations apply to all 
sperm used in fertility clinics in Canada where the recipient 
and donor are not in a sexual relationship. They include a series 
of exclusion criteria that prohibit certain men, such as men over 
40 and men who have had sex with another man, from 
donating.54 The objective of the Regulations is to protect the 
health of women who purchase anonymous sperm from sperm 
banks. However, they apply equally to a woman who conceives 
via assisted conception with a donor who is known to her but 
with whom she has no sexual relationship. Such a woman, if 
she wishes to conceive at a clinic with the sperm of her known 
donor, must apply to the “Special Access Programme”.55 Under 
the programme an excluded donor can be permitted to donate, 
provided he submits to extensive testing. This includes being 
tested for infectious diseases, having his sperm quarantined for 
6 months, and then being retested. If all the tests are negative, 
the woman’s physician may apply to Health Canada for a 
                                                   
53  Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception 
Regulations SOR/96-254. 
54  Technical Requirements for Therapeutic Donor Insemination (Health 
Canada, July 2000), paras 2.1(b) & 2.1(c)(i). The exclusions 
contained within the Technical Requirements for Therapeutic Donor 
Insemination have been challenged and upheld. In Susan Doe v 
Attorney General of Canada, 2007 ONCA 11, it was held that men 
who have sex with men are deemed to be at higher risk of carrying 
certain infectious diseases, such as HIV, and the sperm of men over 
the age of 40 is believed to have higher rates of “spontaneous genetic 
mutations” than the sperm of younger men (at para 42). The 
challenge failed in part because men who fall within the excluded 
categories may be able to donate if they are accepted under the 
special access program.   
55  Health Canada, Guidance on Donor Semen Special Access 
Programme: Donor Semen Eligible for Special Access (Nov 27, 
2002) online: Health Canada < http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-
mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/dssap-
passd_eligiblesemen_spermedonneur-eng.pdf>. 
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special access authorization. The physician must indicate that 
he or she has explained and identified any health risks to the 
recipient woman. Health Canada will then review the 
application and either approve or reject it. There is no certainty 
that a donor will be approved by virtue of going through the 
process. A woman who conceives through a fertility clinic with 
the sperm of her sexual partner is not subject to these 
regulations. 
 
For Beth, who began her journey towards becoming an 
SMC when she was 42, the Regulations proved to be a 
significant legal hurdle. It was Beth’s first choice to conceive 
with the assistance of a male friend who was willing to be 
known to any prospective child. However, after numerous 
unsuccessful attempts at home insemination, Beth began to 
wonder if employing the services of a fertility clinic might 
help. When she approached a clinic in the city in which she 
resided, she was told that, though she had been conducting 
inseminations using her donor’s sperm for months, the clinic 
could not assist her because her donor was 43 and gay, and thus 
excluded under the Regulations. Beth later discovered that this 
information was inaccurate. It was possible to use her donor’s 
sperm if he was willing to apply under the Special Access 
programme. However, knowing that her age meant she had a 
limited timeframe in which to conceive, Beth decided to pursue 
other options. 
 
The other options available to Beth were limited, 
however, by her lack of predictable resources. With an unstable 
income that varied from month to month, Beth found the 
regular costs associated with purchasing sperm 
overwhelming.56 Frustrated by the situation, Beth felt driven to 
                                                   
56  The purchase of sperm is the most significant cost associated with 
donor insemination. Most women reported that the sperm they 
purchased cost $500-$800 a vial. The inseminations themselves cost 
approximately $250. 




engage in higher-risk activities in order to get pregnant. 
Following her failed attempts to conceive with the first known 
donor, Beth made an arrangement with an American man she 
met online through one of the many “free sperm” websites. As 
Beth told the story, she expressed embarrassment about the 
risks she took, noting in particular the “disgusting, grotesque, 
narcissistic” men she encountered on the free sperm websites 
who “all seemed to [want] sex without condoms.” However, 
she felt compelled to follow that route because of her age, the 
cost of sperm, and the limits imposed upon her by the Health 
Canada regulations. As she reflected, “Well, the cost is, is so 
high that I did do unsafe things. The law as well. It pushed me 
to get more and more risky. So I feel like those barriers pushed 
me to do things that I would have never ever thought of.” After 
months of trying to get pregnant at home, Beth had saved 
enough money to fund two more inseminations at a fertility 
clinic using open-identity donor sperm. On the second attempt, 
she became pregnant and, at 43, she gave birth to her daughter. 
While she was happy to have finally become a mother, she 
expressed considerable frustration with the law for limiting her 
reproductive autonomy, especially in a manner that seemed 
particular to SMCs.  
 
Choosing a sperm donor in the shadow of the law 
 
Given that eight of the ten women interviewed conceived using 
the sperm of an anonymous donor one might assume that 
SMCs have a preference for anonymity. The interviews, 
however, revealed a much more complex picture. Six of the 
eight women who conceived with the sperm of an anonymous 
donor stated that they would have preferred to use a known 
donor. While none provided exactly the same reasons for their 
preference, common explanations were that a known donor 
would be accessible to the mother and child if needed, was less 
likely to produce large numbers of children, would be able to 
provide ongoing medical information, and did not charge for 
his sperm. Several of the women also noted that conceiving 
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with a known donor meant they could avoid the fertility 
industry and the medicalization of conception. Yet, despite the 
perceived advantages of a known donor, these six women felt 
that a choosing one was too great a legal risk.  
 
Sara, for example, considered conceiving with a known 
donor and had even discussed the possibility with an old friend. 
However, once she started investigating the matter she 
discovered that the choice raised some substantial legal 
concerns. As Sara explained: 
 
I did a little bit of research and I wasn’t sure 
about the legalities of it. There’s still a lot that’s 
unknown, I don’t know. I don’t think it’s, I want 
to say bullet proof…I might have given more 
consideration to it, the known donor, if there had 
been a little bit more legal certainty around it. 
 
Chelsea had also favoured a known donor but 
developed similar concerns, particularly after she joined her 
local SMC group and received emails about ongoing litigation 
involving SMCs in Canada and elsewhere. As she explained: 
 
All the stuff I saw, the emails and stuff like that, 
it just, I just cannot imagine having an 
agreement in place, having parental rights 
severed, and then, for whatever reason, being 
able to have that challenged at a later date in any 
way, shape, or form. Whether the person 
changed their mind or the person passed away, 
or whatever. Cause obviously we all have [the] 
best interests of our children at heart. And we 
want, we’re just trying to protect them beyond 
anything else. And how that can be changed, 
like, I just. It just isn’t right. 
 




Many of the women who favoured known donors but 
ultimately decided against them expressed similar concerns, 
referring to such arrangements as “dangerous”, “legally risky” 
or, as Sally put it, “a hot bed of legal crazy.” 
 
The women were justified in fearing known donors. 
Single women in Canada who have conceived, whether via 
intercourse57 or assisted conception, with a known donor who 
has subsequently sought access through the courts have 
uniformly lost their cases. 58 Courts have refused to consider 
known donors to be anything but legal fathers and have 
awarded access on a routine basis. Even in Quebec, the only 
jurisdiction in Canada in which the possibility of a single 
mother by choice is explicitly recognized via legislation (even 
when conception occurs via intercourse),59 the case law has not 
been encouraging.60 Once the women joined their local SMC 
group they became aware of this legal environment and, with 
the case law as a backdrop, few of them felt comfortable 
pursuing a known donor arrangement. 
 
Despite all of the risks involved, two of the mothers, 
Casey and Marjorie, nonetheless chose to conceive with known 
donors. Interestingly, both women identified as lesbians and, 
because of their involvement in the lesbian community, were 
familiar with the legal challenges associated with known donor 
arrangements long before they decided to have a child on their 
own. Perhaps because of their familiarity with the legal issues, 
both Casey and Marjorie chose to engage with the law during 
                                                   
57  In Quebec, conception via intercourse does not preclude the 
possibility of the man being considered a sperm “donor”. Civil Code 
of Quebec, SQ 1991, c64, articles 538 & 538.2. 
58  For a discussion of the case law on this issue see Kelly, “Autonomous 
from the Start”, supra note 3. 
59  Arts 538-42 CCQ. 
60  LB & EB c GN, [2011] JQ no 7881. 
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the pre-conception period in an attempt to clarify the legal 
relationships involved. They each received independent legal 
advice from a lawyer who specialized in lesbian and gay 
parenting arrangements and entered into written agreements 
with their donors. Though they included a variety of issues, the 
essence of the agreements was that the donor was not a legal 
parent and that the mother was the child’s sole parent.  
 
Despite their engagement with the law, Marjorie and 
Casey knew that there was little they could do to protect 
themselves legally. For example, both women understood that 
the agreements they had entered into, and paid a considerable 
amount of money to have prepared, were of little legal value. 
Yet, they clung to the few legal mechanisms available to them 
out of fear. As Casey explained:  
 
I knew the agreement wasn’t worth much more 
than the paper it was printed on. However, I 
knew that it was a huge mistake not to have one. 
You know, it doesn’t, it’s one of those situations 
where there’s this gap in the law. Where all, 
where the best thing one could do, according to 
the advice I had was to state our intentions and 
move forward from there. Which is what I did.  
 
As Casey’s comment suggests, the women understood that 
despite their attempts to engage the law, they remained legally 
vulnerable. In particular, they struggled with the idea that they 
could not formally sever any legal rights the donor might have, 
creating a situation of constant uncertainty. As Marjorie 
explained: 
 
I think it would be useful for SMCs to have a 
single person be able to be the sole legal parent. 
Because it, you know, it does put us into legal 
jeopardy. Because as far as I know you can’t, I 
can’t legally [sever] Sam’s [parental rights], 




without having a second person to put on the 
birth certificate in his place. And I think that’s 
dangerous, because it leaves the parent and any 
children conceived out of that donor 
insemination agreement perpetually at risk of, 
you know, custody or access [disputes]. Or, you 
know Sam…was cut off from his family of 
origin because he’s gay, and so we’ve never had 
to deal with, you know, what his siblings or 
grandparents think. But, you know, if Sam and I 
had had this agreement and he was the one who 
had the early death and his parents wanted to go 
after my kids because they were his genetic 
information, or that sort of thing. Like I, that’s 
again not my particular case. But I could see that 
being a concern for single parents by choice. 
[They] need to be able to be a sole legal parent 
without having to have a second name [on the 
birth certificate]. You know, if the agreement is 
that you’re intentionally bringing a child [into 
the world] on your own…the law should support 
that.  
 
While Marjorie’s donor, Sam, was respectful of their 
agreement, Marjorie nonetheless understood that she was, at 
least objectively, “perpetually at risk.” While Marjorie could 
live with this uncertainty, Casey could not.  
 
Casey conceived her daughter with a known donor, a 
friend who was supportive of her decision to become an SMC. 
They each received independent legal advice and signed a 
written agreement that stated that Casey was the sole parent 
and the donor would only be known to the child upon the 
child’s request. Knowing that “the agreement wasn’t worth 
much more than the paper it was printed on”, Casey asked her 
lawyer whether there were any other legal mechanisms 
available to clarify her sole parent status. Casey’s lawyer noted 
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that an increasing number of lesbian couples with known 
donors were applying, at the time of their child’s birth, for a 
declaration of legal parentage that served to sever any parental 
rights the donor might have. 61  Though an SMC had never 
attempted to secure such a declaration, and would not be able 
to provide a second parent to fill the void left by the donor, the 
lawyer speculated that Casey might still be able to utilize the 
procedure. When her daughter was a few months old and, with 
the support and consent of the donor who had never met the 
child, Casey applied for such a declaration. The response was 
swift and shocking. 
 
Within 48 hours of filing the application “it blew up.” 
Casey’s lawyer was told that if the application were pursued, 
the Attorney General would oppose it and “take her all the way 
to the Supreme Court of Canada.” Given the threat, as well as 
the leaking of the case to the media, Casey withdrew her 
application. As Casey explained: 
 
The Attorney General intervened and had a 
complete fit at the mere idea that the province 
would support a woman to be a sole parent. That 
this was something to be pitied and not sought 
after, this particular role. And that certainly the 
state had an obligation to object. Because it 
would open the door for letting dead beat dads 
off the hook everywhere. And, it would elevate 
the status of sole parents in society and make 
this seem like a legitimate family structure, like 
when in fact it’s, the impression I got really is 
that it’s, you know, morally, legally, everything 
else objectionable to the state at this time. And 
                                                   
61  The benefit of a declaration of legal parentage is that it can be applied 
for at the time of the child’s birth, whereas a second parent adoption, 
the method by which non-biological lesbian mothers usually become 
legal parents, cannot be obtained until the child is six months old.  




they made it clear that they would go all the way 
to the Supreme Court of Canada and fight this 
tooth and nail. And my lawyer just said, hands 
down, it’s a resource-based system. You will be 
dragged through the courts for ten years. If you 
choose to fight this, you will absolutely lose. . . 
You’d be completely crazy to even try it. You 
do not go up against a force like that. They’ve 
made it clear that they’ll stop at nothing to make 
sure you do not get to be legally recognized as 
the sole parent of your child. 
 
Casey’s experience demonstrates how invested, both 
economically and socially, the state remains in perpetuating the 
two parent family. The fear that SMCs will become a strain on 
the public purse or that single motherhood will become a 
“legitimate” form of family represent the hallmarks of both 
neo-liberal and neo-conservative thought. The intervention of 
the Attorney General also suggests that if SMCs attempt to 
pursue recognition of their families in the courts, they will face 
strong opposition.  
 
Interestingly, Casey’s story did not end with the 
withdrawal of her application. Adamant that she be recognized 
as her child’s sole legal parent, she applied six months later to 
complete a single parent adoption of her own child as a 
backdoor way by which to achieve sole parentage. In a bizarre 
turn of events, the application was allowed. Casey and her 
donor consented to the severing of their parental rights and 
then Casey adopted her daughter as a sole parent. The entire 
matter was completed before a desk clerk and left Casey 
bewildered. As she explained: 
 
The first step was to give up my rights as a birth 
parent. I did do that even though it’s just, I think 
it’s highly objectionable. I objected to having to 
do that on all kinds of grounds. And certainly, 
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you know, the Attorney General is a fool in my 
mind that it even got passed as easily as it did. I 
thought the desk clerk must have been drunk or 
something at the time. To like, they did not even 
question what this was. They signed off, no 
problem. So the idea that my plan to be my 
child’s sole parent wasn’t viable or acceptable to 
them, but I could adopt my own child without a 
blink of an eye. It’s like, holy smokes! 
 
While Casey achieved her goal of becoming her daughter’s 
sole legal parent, she was concerned about the future. For 
example, she noted that she had recently filled in several forms 
which asked whether her child was adopted. She had not 
known how to respond given that her daughter was both her 
birth child and adopted. She also worried for her daughter who 
would likely face similar administrative problems as she got 
older. Casey thus lamented the fact that the law was not more 
welcoming to SMCs, arguing that the failure of the law to 
acknowledge her family had created a much more damaging 
legal situation for her child.  
 
Casey’s story, coupled with the small number of 
judicial decisions involving SMCs, demonstrate exactly why 
many of the women felt that, despite their individual 
preferences, it is simply too risky to conceive with a known 
donor.62 Anonymity brought with it legal certainty and, for as 
long as the law refused to respect a woman’s decision to parent 
on her own, it remained the most sensible option for most 
SMCs. 
                                                   
62  My research on lesbian mothers revealed similar findings. While 
about a third of the mothers I interviewed chose to conceive with a 
known donor, many more would have done so had the law provided 
some clarity as to the donor’s legal status. Fiona Kelly, Transforming 
Law’s Family: The Legal Recognition of Planned Lesbian 
Motherhood (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) at 98-101. 




Post-birth legal autonomy 
 
Once the women had their children, most were surprised to find 
that they experienced little overt challenge to their sole 
parentage. None were challenged when they registered their 
child’s birth as a sole parent, or when they applied for a 
passport or birth certificate. Enrolling their children in daycare 
and school also posed no challenge. That the women were 
rarely questioned about their assertion of sole parentage by 
bureaucratic bodies such as Vital Statistics is interesting in 
light of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Trociuk v 
British Columbia.63 In Trociuk, the biological father of triplets 
challenged the mother’s decision to exclude him from their 
children’s birth certificates and give them her surname only. 
The mother excluded the father on the basis that they had only 
briefly co-habited prior to the children’s conception and that 
she was essentially raising the triplets on her own. Finding in 
favour of the father, the Supreme Court held that the statutory 
provisions64 that permitted the mother to “arbitrarily” exclude 
the father from the children’s birth certificates and the process 
of naming infringed upon his Charter equality rights.65 Given 
the decision in Trociuk, it is surprising that none of the women 
were questioned about their child’s paternity when registering 
the birth or applying for a birth certificate. Rather, the assertion 
of sole parentage by the mothers was accepted without 
question, suggesting that Trociuk has had little impact on the 
day-to-day practices of Vital Statistics. 
 
Reflecting on why their status as sole parents was 
rarely questioned by the numerous bureaucratic bodies they 
encountered, some of the women suggested that they were 
simply the beneficiaries of a progressive and tolerant 
                                                   
63  Trociuk v British Columbia (AG) [2003] 1 SCR 835. 
64  Vital Statistics Act, RSBC 1996, c 479, s 3(1)(b). 
65  Trociuk, supra note 63 at paras 15-19. 
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environment. For example, Lisa, who had moved to Canada in 
her thirties, believed that the diversity of the city in which she 
lived meant that she experienced a greater level of acceptance 
than she would have in her country of origin. As Lisa 
explained: 
  
I think it’s just a very open community where I 
know that [my son] is not going to be the only 
child with a single parent, you know. So I think 
it’s the demographics of [this city] where there’s 
so many different families. And I think we are a 
lot more of an accepting community. I get that 
sense anyways, so that’s why I didn’t really 
hesitate to…do it. Had I been in [my home 
country], I don’t know if I would have got as 
much support. Um, but I’ve never done it, so 
who knows?  
 
Lydia, who grew up on the Canadian prairies, also 
argued that the diversity and progressiveness of the city in 
which she lived made it conducive to becoming an SMC. 
Before having her daughter, Lydia had considered moving back 
to her hometown to be closer to family, but when she explored 
the websites of the local fertility clinics she noticed that, in 
stark contrast to the clinics in the city in which she lived, single 
women were not even mentioned. She also failed to locate a 
local SMC support group. Fearing that she might find herself 
legally and socially marginalized in the prairies, Lydia decided 
to stay put.   
 
Several of the women speculated that they also reduced 
the likelihood of bureaucratic challenge by approaching 
situations pro-actively. For example, a number of the mothers 
noted that when they enrolled their child in a new daycare or 
school they usually made an appointment with the appropriate 
official to discuss their family situation. This was designed to 
reduce speculation about the family’s circumstances and 




circumvent any challenge to the mother’s assertion that she was 
the child’s sole parent. Given that many school and daycare 
enrolment forms require the contact details of the child’s father 
or, if the parents are separated, a custody agreement indicating 
each parent’s level of access, the mothers felt it best to address 
the issue pro-actively. As Lydia, who always wrote “Not 
applicable” on the “father” section of forms, explained, “I’m 
straight up with everybody, you know? I don’t want them to 
feel uncomfortable asking and have the awkwardness there. It’s 
more proactive as opposed to waiting.”  
 
While few of the women had experienced overt legal 
challenge to their assertion of sole parentage, most had felt the 
subtle impact of a legal and social environment that assumes 
and favours the two-parent, biological family. Whether filling 
in school enrolment forms or crossing international borders, the 
women found themselves carefully negotiating a normative 
environment that rendered them suspect. The circumstance in 
which the women were most frequently challenged as SMCs 
was when they travelled internationally with their children. 
Border crossings usually resulted in extensive questioning of 
the women and, sometimes, their children. Interestingly, all of 
the women who had experienced harassment during border 
crossings noted that Canadian immigration officials were the 
most likely to challenge them and were the most rigorous in 
their questioning. Lisa described a fairly typical situation where 
she was returning to Canada from the United States with her 
toddler son: 
 
I went to the States. I was grilled on the way 
back to Canada. I only ever travel with his 
passport. I’d never considered that I needed his 
birth certificate. And the guy at the border 
crossing on the way back said, “Okay, well, 
who’s his dad?” And I said, “Well, he doesn’t 
have one.” And he said, “He’s got to have one.” 
I said, “You know, I had a donor. He’s a donor 
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baby.” And he said, “Well, what’s to say you’re, 
you know, you’re not taking him out of the 
country?” And I was like, “Well, I’m coming 
back into Canada!” So there was this whole big 
thing. So he, he gave me, you know, a bit of the 
third degree. And I was like, okay, but I’ve 
never been asked this before. And he said, “But 
you’re just telling me you’re his Mum.” “Well, I 
am!” And he said, “Well, you know, you should 
have his birth certificate.” So, of course the next 
three times I went across the border I had his 
birth certificate and his passport and nobody 
asked. 
 
While immigration officials have an obligation to ensure that a 
child is not being abducted, the women felt that the guards 
subjected them to an unusual level of questioning, particularly 
once they asserted that their child did not have a father. After 
her experience with the border guard, Lisa suggested that birth 
certificates include some mechanism for verifying that the 
child has only one legal parent so questioning of the kind she 
experienced could be avoided.  
 
In an attempt to diminish challenges such as those 
experienced at the border, many of the women had obtained a 
letter from their fertility clinic indicating that their child was 
donor conceived and had only one parent. A number of the 
women noted that border officials routinely asked for a clinic 
letter as “proof” when the mother asserted that the child was 
donor conceived, suggesting that such letters have become part 
of the legal fabric surrounding SMCs. Of course, only those 
who conceive at a fertility clinic can produce such a letter, 
reinforcing the vulnerability of women who conceive with 
known donors. Marjorie, who conceived her two daughters 
with a known donor, travels with a statutory declaration stating 
that she is their sole parent. However, she quickly noted that “it 
has no real legal standing.”  




While the women experienced little overt legal 
challenge to their assertion of sole parentage, they were all very 
conscious of the times where they were potentially vulnerable. 
They carefully negotiated those situations by being pro-active 
and gathering supporting documentation, perpetually ready to 
meet the challenge. Though few complained about the situation 
in which they found themselves, a number voiced frustration 
that even in the face of dramatic legal and social change, the 





The law was rarely an overt presence in the lives of the SMCs 
interviewed, but it nonetheless shaped some key aspects of 
their motherhood. Provincial parentage laws denied them a 
mechanism by which to clearly establish their sole parentage 
and required them to accept legal uncertainty if they wished to 
conceive with a known donor. The law’s preference for, and 
assumption of, a two-parent family meant that they needed to 
be pro-active in explaining their situation in order to avoid 
bureaucratic challenge. Finally, the women found that the lack 
of law surrounding the fertility industry meant that sperm 
banks and fertility clinics determined important issues such as 
the number of offspring a donor could produce. While law 
reform was not an explicit topic of the interviews, the women 
expressed support for reforming Canada’s legal parentage laws, 
as well as the fertility industry. Most supported a complete 
overhaul of provincial parentage laws to include the explicit 
recognition of SMC-headed families and clarification of the 
legal status of known donors. All of the mothers also called for 
reform of the fertility industry, with many noting that Canada 
needed to develop its own sperm banks so that the lack of 
regulation in the United States would no longer be a burden 
experienced by Canadian SMCs.  
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At present, SMCs have little voice at the law reform 
table. Despite representing approximately 13 per cent of clients 
using fertility services in British Columbia, SMCs were not 
mentioned once in the many law reform documents associated 
with British Columbia’s new parentage laws. It is thus not 
surprising that the reforms offer only minimal recognition for 
SMCs. Yet, as their numbers grow and their sense of 
community is strengthened, there is no doubt that SMCs will 
join lesbians, gay men, and other non-normative families at the 
bargaining table, demanding recognition of their families of 
choice. 
 
 
